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Ontological Status of Molecular Structure 
Giuseppe Del Re 
Abstract: Molecular structure (MS) has been treated as a convention or an 
epiphenomenon by physicists and quantum chemists interpreting the mathe-
matical formalism of quantum mechanics as the essential reality criterion in 
the submicroscopic world (R2 world). This paper argues that, (a) even in the 
R2 world there is a class of entities which are real per se, even though they can-
not be separated from their material support, and MS may belong to that class; 
(b) MS actualizes a particular molecule from the many potentialities of a given 
set of nuclei and electrons, all present in the same Schrödinger equation; (c) 
MS is a fact established in the XIXth century, albeit as a result of circumstan-
tial evidence (because of its belonging to the R2 world); (d) the fact that MS is 
known, as all objects of the atomic world, in terms of analogies with macro-
scopic models, is not valid grounds for questioning its reality; (e) MS is a set 
of topological as well as geometrical relations. All along the discussion, ob-
servability according to Bohr, Heisenberg, Feynman is taken as the essential 
criterion of reality in the R2 world. On its basis, quantum mechanics is by no 
means in conflict with the reality of molecular structure and shape. On the 
other hand, the question of the minimum lifetime required for a MS proper to 
exist should be left open, pending a detailed analysis of measurement tech-
niques.  
Keywords: ontology, molecular structure, quantum mechanics, analogy, observ-
ability.  
Introduction 
Tradition has it that Paul Dirac, after casting quantum mechanics into his well 
known formalism, echoed Shakespeare by saying: “the rest is chemistry.” He 
apparently thought that chemistry is only a sort of scientific cuisine. Also 
Werner Heisenberg, though a man of great culture, was mistaken about the 
program and field of inquiry of chemistry, for he suggested that chemistry 
had merged with physics into quantum mechanics by bringing the atom to 
the latter;1 the mistake being, of course, that if chemistry has anything to do 
with atoms, it is because they are the building blocks of molecules. 82  Giuseppe Del Re 
  Other founding fathers of quantum mechanics certainly knew better: in 
particular, Born and Oppenheimer considered it extremely important for the 
validation of the new-born quantum mechanics that it should be proven that, 
despite the uncertainty principle, the new theory was perfectly compatible 
with the empirically founded notion of chemical structure. Also the work of 
Heitler, Hückel, Slater, Pauling, Hund, and others was aimed at finding out if 
quantum mechanics could account for the known building rules of molecules 
and possibly extend their scope. This was done by introducing special, ad hoc 
assumptions into a quantum mechanical perturbational treatment.2 
  However,  curiously  enough,  in  later  years  the  belief  spread,  especially 
among chemists, that, in the world of atoms and molecules, real is what is 
explicitly contained in the equations of quantum mechanics. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, that ideas (probably inspired by theories of atomic nuclei) ac-
cording to which the chemical bond is a convention, and molecular structure 
is merely a property of chemical formulas were received with indifference: the 
great battle against such conventionalists as the great chemists Ian Berzelius 
and Wilhelm Ostwald seemed to have been won in vain. 
  Yet, after almost a century of hard work and debates, by about 1900 the 
organic chemists had reached the conclusion that structure is the fundamen-
tal fact of the world of molecules; in the long run, therefore, further progress 
in our understanding of the physical world might be seriously hindered by 
the existing uncertainty about the epistemological and ontological status of 
molecular structure and related concepts. 
  This situation has prompted the reflections presented in this paper, which 
is  intended  as  a  contribution  towards  the  re-establishment  of  consistency 
with historical facts and a critical analysis of the reasons why even the foun-
ders of quantum mechanics considered molecular structure, bonds, valence as 
ascertained properties of matter. 
  Our exposition will be divided into four parts. In part A we shall consider 
judgments of existence on things which cannot be isolated from their mate-
rial support (second class entities); in part B we shall look at the status of the 
latter in the picture of the physical world suggested by recent advances of 
science; in part C we shall pause on the history of molecular structure, to 
show how it came to be considered a fact before quantum mechanics; in part 
D we shall see on what grounds and in what sense molecular structure is 
more than ever a second class entity whose presence in molecules is a fact 
which characterizes molecules as distinct from atom clusters and other par-
ticle  aggregates. The last part will demand a brief tour into the quantum-
mechanical theory of time-dependent states.   Ontological Status of Molecular Structure  83 
Part A: Ontological status of relational entities 
A.1  Foundations 
We  accept  the  strong-realism  axiom,  according  to  which  there  are  things, 
events and processes independent of our own existence and will, and they can 
be individually known by us, within limits imposed by our senses and brain, 
as existing and distinct from other objects. 
  We also accept the classical view that ordinary intuitive existence judg-
ments can be taken as starting points for a critical analysis, needed anyway to 
determine, as the case may be, either what precisely an existence judgment 
applies to, or why it is mistaken. 
  As is well known, realism was challenged by philosophers since the birth 
of philosophy.3 In modern science a sort of idealistic approach to what sci-
ence studies has been built on the difficulties quantum mechanics has with 
the role of the observer in experiments. Actually, there is much to say in 
favor  of  the  possibility  that  a  careful  distinction  between  ‘observer’  and 
‘perceiving subject’ would remove the reality issue from the overfull episte-
mological agenda of theoretical physics. However that may be, the neoposi-
tivistic view of science was very popular for a time. However, inconsistencies 
turned out, and it would now seem that scientists prefer to believe that what 
they study is reality. 
  A double classification of real entities is essential for our study. The first 
one is that between first class (FC) entities,4 i.e. objects existing per se (say, a 
tree or a molecule), and second class (SC) entities (say, the psyche of a dog or 
a man), which presuppose a ‘carrier’, even though they can be treated, within 
certain limits, as if they were FC entities.5 The second distinction is between 
entities  directly  and  indirectly  accessible  to  sensible  experience  –  which 
Schummer6, following Harré, calls R1 and R2 entities, respectively. In this 
paper, R1 is used for entities which can be perceived as such, R2 for entities 
believed to exist because of analogical and logical evidence similar in nature to 
that by which a judge may condemn a man as the author of a crime. 
A.2  Aspects of existence judgments 
A few examples of entities on which a judgment of existence is made are 
listed below to attract attention to points relevant to the chemical structure 
problem. They are given in pairs: the latter member of each pair is similar to 
the former but involves R2 entities. 
1a:  A quartz crystal & a benzene crystal. 
1b:  Flour & the chemical substance benzene. 84  Giuseppe Del Re 
·  Example 1a compares a standard reality judgment with one still bearing 
on  directly  perceived  objects  but  partly  based  on  indirect  evidence, 
possibly in the form of reports accepted by general consensus. 
·  Example 1b is parallel to 1a, but refers to entities whose existence no 
one would deny, and yet are partly abstract, for they can be experi-
enced as pieces with a variety of shapes and sizes, not isolated ‘in the 
laboratory’ as such. 
2: A microscopic mite & a benzene molecule. 
·  A molecule is a typical example of what Harré and Schummer call R2 
entities; a microscopic mite is an intermediate example, which differs 
from a molecule inasmuch as it finds an immediate model by analogy 
with direct experience. 
3a:  A computer program in general & a computer program for the benzene 
normal modes. 
3b:  Organization & a benzene-producing organization. 
·  A computer program is an SC entity which can be ‘transferred’ from 
one computer to another, and can be stored on all sorts of material 
supports. 
·  Organization is a property of a whole which cannot be reduced to the 
properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on those 
of the others and on the aims of the whole. The very special nature of 
organization  is  recognized  from  linguistic  usage,  which  treats  ‘an 
organization’ as an entity per se. 
·  Both a program and an organization pattern are cases of information, 
but it remains to be seen if organization is transferable, as is the case in 
general with information. 
4a:  A pattern in a carpet & partly miscible liquid layers. 
4b:  A solid-state radio set & crystal structure. 
·  SC entities come into existence (‘emerge’) as a result of the arrange-
ment or interconnection of certain parts of a whole, but are not the 
parts,  even  though  they  can  be  traced  back  to  specially  situated  or 
connected R1 or R2 entities;  
·  important SC entities of this type are associated to wholes whose be-
havior  results  from  special  relations  among  many  interacting  parts, 
ranging from tight dynamical cooperation of the parts (case of a radio 
set) to persistent ordering due to weak pairwise interactions (case of a 
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Part B: Levels of reality and the role of analogies 
B.1  The nature of the physical world 
The  traditional  expression  ‘physical  world’  covers  all  that  can  be  detected 
directly or indirectly by our five senses. The above examples show that the 
claim that the whole physical world is nothing but ‘atoms and quanta’ is as 
untenable as the claim that airplanes, tractors, cars, trains, bridges, etc., are 
but the materials of which they are made. That is to say, a given collection of 
atoms and quanta – or indeed of fundamental particles – can in general form 
an incredibly large number of different physical systems, each with its own 
identity and specific properties. 
  In principle, the possible existence and properties of those systems can be 
quantitatively predicted from the properties of the constituent particles. To 
that end, however, the physical conditions which correspond to existence and 
the nature of the properties must be known or guessed, unless they are sim-
ply sums of corresponding properties of the parts; moreover, the collection 
of particles from which a system arises contains part of information about 
that  system  only  potentially.  In  other  words,  information  about  possible 
wholes  is  partly  either  latent  or  not  uniquely  specified  in  the  constituents, 
meaning by ‘latent’ that the problem remains of knowing which global prop-
erties are possible that are not sums of the properties of the parts, and by ‘not 
uniquely  specified’  the  fact  that  a  specific  system  of  n  given  particles  is 
formed by selection out of many possibilities. 
  A chemical example of such a selection process is the sequence of opera-
tions by which one isomer is selected out of many. For example, given six 
carbon atoms and six hydrogen atoms, the rules of valency predict 217 differ-
ent molecules (and hence 217 different chemical substances) formed with the 
same atoms (‘isomers’). Although a much greater number of aggregates of 
the same number and species of atoms can be imagined, no chemist has any 
doubt that those 217 and only those 217 can be synthesized, the reserves 
being that some of the possible molecules can be relatively unstable because 
of steric hindrance or bond bending, and therefore they might have to be 
isolated under very special conditions, say, very low temperatures; and some 
isomers may be equivalent forms of the same molecule (cf. our comment on 
the Kekulé structures at the end of Sect. D.4). 
  Starting from the 42 electrons and the 12 nuclei of benzene, the only way 
to predict theoretically the possible ‘existence’ of those substances consists in: 
(a)  declaring  that  there  is  a  molecule  when there is a chemically stable 
configuration, i.e. one corresponding to a free-energy minimum such 
that  its  lifetime  with  respect  to  spontaneous  isomerization  is  suffi-
ciently long for chemical observation;7  86  Giuseppe Del Re 
(b)  writing down the Hamiltonian operator for the given nuclei and elec-
trons; 
(c)  trying  to  solve  the  Schrödinger  equation  by  a  numerical  quantum 
mechanical exploration of the whole 162-dimensional energy hyper-
surface defined by the 42 electrons and 12 nuclei, with the vibrational 
analysis required for entropy computations. 
Such a procedure is possible in principle with a sufficiently powerful com-
puter, but it is conceptually similar to (and not as reliable as) an empirical 
search for the isomers of benzene not guided by the laws of valency; more-
over, since the information contained in the chemical formula according to 
the theory of valency also concerns chemical reactivity, further ad hoc criteria 
would be necessary. 
  In conclusion, the criteria of existence of molecules are provided by the 
building laws formulated in the theory of valency quite independently of the 
fact that quantum mechanical computations lead to the same molecules if the 
right input data and definitions are provided. 
B.2  Two examples of complex systems 
What we have seen so far seems strongly to suggest that the aporias and limi-
tations of physicalistic reductionism (‘the world is nothing but atoms and 
quanta’) require the adoption of a new general picture of the physical world 
as a system made of (sub-)systems of different orders of size and degrees of 
complexity. The subsystems in question range from tightly integrated ones to 
weakly interacting ones which still have an identity of their own. 
  A molecule and a cell provide two concrete reference examples for our 
further reflections. 
a) A molecule 
A molecule is a collection of electrons and nuclei, and can be described as 
such. However, as seen on the case of benzene, a description at this level 
leaves a large number of possibilities open, because – at variance with a plasma 
or  an  atom  cluster  –  the  way  in  which  the  electrons  and  nuclei  are  put 
together  matters,  and  the  ‘connections’  (chemical  bonds)  determine  the 
properties  of the whole. Moreover, at variance with the physicists’ liquid-
drop model, a molecule appears to be a persistent entity, whose demolition 
requires ad hoc conditions or processes. 
  The boom of research on molecules of the fullerene class after their dis-
covery in 1985 was due precisely to the fact that, thought at first to be just 
amorphous clusters of carbon atoms, on closer inspection they turned out to 
have properties not explicable by the liquid-drop model or by analogy with a 
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  If a complete description of the nuclei and electrons of a molecule is not a 
complete description of the molecule (cf. Sect. B.1), for the whole reality of a 
molecule as distinct from everything else includes ‘emergent properties’, then 
clearly a picture of the physical world only granting reality to the ultimate 
constituents of matter falls short of accounting for factual evidence. 
b) A cell 
In a cell, as in a molecule, something becomes actual and uniquely specified 
that is only one possibility, selected in the course of its formation out of the 
many possibilities compatible with the nature of its constituents. But it dif-
fers dramatically from a molecule in at least three ways. First, it is far more 
complicated than a molecule. Secondly, it is what it is, not because it cor-
responds to a metastable configuration of the atoms and electrons which con-
stitute it, but because its coordinated activity (‘entelechy’) is finalized, aimed 
at holding it alive in a particular (normal) state. Thirdly, it can be divided into 
significant constituents of at least two different sorts: either comparatively 
large  parts  (membrane,  lysosomes,  nucleus,  mitochondria,  etc.),  or  the 
macromolecules and the media in which they operate, which are its building 
blocks from the point of view of molecular biology.8 
  Is there really such an object as a cell? Every biologist would answer this 
question by an emphatical ‘yes’. More or less as the microscopic mite men-
tioned above, it is midway between an R2 entity and an R1 entity, for there 
are cells which are directly accessible to plain observation (the eggs of birds, 
reptiles, etc.). If any given cell exists, the question ‘what-is-it’ (Aristotle’s 
famous  ‘to  ti  en’)  is  justified.  Within  the  frame  of  molecular  biology  the 
answer might be: it is a collection of water, biologically active molecules and 
enzymes, as well as a single entity with properties which cannot be attributed 
to any single component or group of components. 
  Of course, a cell is also a collection of molecules and macromolecules in 
the chemical sense, a collection of nuclei and electrons, and so on down and 
down to the ultimate particles. 
B.3  Complexity levels 
Thus,  far  from  being  void  of  meaning,  as  the  anti-essentialists  claim,  the 
questions “what is a molecule? What is a cell?” can be answered in a multi-
plicity of ways, all true, but all different in the load of ‘actual’ information 
they carry. One can express this in terms of ‘complexity levels’. A complexity 
level of a thing is the reality of that thing seen as a collection of wholes of a 
certain  degree  of  complexity,  treated  as  indivisible  building  blocks (which 
might be called, faute de mieux, the ‘elementary objects’ of that level),9 from 
which that thing emerges as a whole by successive (spontaneous and envi-88  Giuseppe Del Re 
ronment-conditioned) appearance of order, structure, organization. A refer-
ence analogy might by a many-storey pyramidal building: at the foundation, 
there is a shapeless, structureless assemblage of countless particles (say, the 
fundamental particles) with an extremely small number of properties each. 
Above it there might be (depending on the particular thing under considera-
tion)  the  same  particles  already  grouped  into  simple  wholes  (say,  atomic 
nuclei); and the number of elementary objects which are parts of the given 
thing at the top would then be smaller, but the number of properties of each 
larger. In the next storey, those elementary objects would combine in groups 
to form structured wholes, which are the elementary objects of the new level 
(say, molecules), viz. new wholes with even more properties – although some 
of those of the lower level become unobservable or irrelevant – but fewer in 
number. Up and up the scale one would find the elementary objects of mo-
lecular biology, the corpuscles and media in a cell, and finally the cell itself, if 
that is the complex system whose reality one is trying to grasp. If one had a 
living organism in mind, then the pyramid would continue up to organs, the 
psyche, and the organism itself. 
  The  storeys  of  the  pyramid  represent  what  we have called ‘complexity 
levels’; and we may therefore speak of a ‘complexity pyramid’. In most scien-
tific  approaches  the  levels  come  in  pairs:  that  at  which  the  system  to  be 
analyzed is an elementary object, and another, usually the immediately under-
lying one, provides the parts out of which it results. Theoretical physics tends 
to ignore the intermediate storeys, and tries to represent all systems as con-
sisting of elementary particles (or of quasi-elementary ones). Since originally 
the  elementary  particles  were  the  atomic  nuclei  and  electrons,  theoretical 
physics accounts for ‘ordinary matter’ by the Schrödinger equation, as al-
ready  discussed.  The  reality  of complex systems, whether metastable (like 
molecules) or steady-state ones (like cells), is actualized by selecting certain 
sets of quantum states out of those of the general system of nuclei and elec-
trons,  in  which  all  actual  systems  are  potentially  contained  that  are  com-
patible with the number of the electrons and the number and species of the 
nuclei (see below). 
  Perhaps even groups of particles lasting less than a femtosecond (if, as it is 
claimed, that is a feasible observation time) might be treated as a real physical 
system;  but  they  do  not  define  complexity  levels,  because  the  latter  are 
defined with reference to objects which persist long enough to interact as 
such  with  their  environment.  This  remark  shows  that  there  is  a  relation 
between existence, entities, observability, and lifetime; we shall return to it 
presently. 
  The most important point in the complexity level view, which eliminates 
for one thing the aporia between physics and biology, is that, on the one 
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appears as a unit is essential for a complete description of its reality, while, on 
the other hand, at each lower level the information actual in the given object 
is partly latent and indeterminate; so that the reality of the upper levels can-
not  be  completely  predicted,  unless  the  process  by  which  the  elementary 
objects (the ‘parts’) are put together and the nature of the emergent proper-
ties are known. Moreover, at each higher level the nature of the individual 
constituents of the elementary objects is irrelevant as such, for it melts into 
the overall properties. This is not in contrast with the existence of additive 
properties, although they are a case where consideration of the complexity 
levels is merely academic: suffice it to mention that even the weight of the 
whole, though a typically additive property, does not tell anything about the 
nature of the parts. 
B.4  Size levels and the direct-access level. 
Size is related to complexity because there is a rough parallelism between size 
and degree of complexity of a physical system, whether nonliving or living. 
However,  the  epistemological  import  of  size  is  quite  different,  because  it 
operates a three-fold partition among objects of the world in which any given 
living being capable of knowledge, albeit rudimentary, is immersed. There are 
objects whose sizes lie within the range of the bodily senses – which can be 
entirely touched and seen (or detected by smelling, hearing, or possibly tast-
ing) without the help of instruments. In the case of a human ‘perceiver’ those 
objects have sizes ranging from not more than that of a man to those of 
things at the limit of vision. They belong to a ‘size level’ which we shall call 
the ‘direct-access level’ (DAL). The DAL is the size level of our ordinary ex-
perience, on which immediate and usually reliable reality judgments are based. 
  Then there are objects which we think we know directly – say, the Earth, 
or even just a mountain – but actually that is not the case, because what we 
perceive of them at the DAL is either a remote, intangible image, or parts of 
them, from which we reconstruct the whole. Similarly, but the other way 
round, we think we know directly that a powder is made of extremely tiny 
grains, but as a matter of fact we only see the powder. These examples are 
actually simple examples of a procedure which modern science has systemati-
cally applied since the time of Galileo: with the help of the telescope and the 
microscope, it has extended the range of the DAL by entrusting reality judg-
ments to indirect sight and inference by analogy, as already mentioned on the 
example of a microscopic mite. Whenever the analogy is immediate (the Earth 
with a sphere, the mite with other Acari), the reality judgment is assumed to 
have the same validity as one made within the DAL. We can therefore speak 
of an extended direct-access level (EDAL). 
  A mountain and a mite are FC entities, which need no support to exist. As 
to SC entities, in the direction of decreasing sizes the development of mod-90  Giuseppe Del Re 
ern science coincided to a large extent (though by no means entirely) with 
their identification with invisible and intangible FC entities acting as causes; 
for example, diseases were traced back to the action of specific micro-organ-
isms. The enthusiasm for the applications of that discovery gradually made 
people forget that those microorganisms are not the disease, but its cause; 
properly speaking, a disease is today what it was in ancient Greece: an altera-
tion of the normal operation of the body, i.e. a modification of the relations 
among the parts of the body. 
  In other words, knowledge about things, events and processes at a size 
level of the R2 type can only be attained and formalized in terms of analogies 
with the DAL which include both FC and SC entities. This implies in parti-
cular that the extension of analogy to the world of molecules is indispensable 
to make the reality outside the extended direct-access level (EDAL) detect-
able and treatable at a linguistic level. Coherent sets of relations among the 
parts of an object which can be thought of independently of their material 
support (e.g. a structure) may therefore be expected to exist by analogy in the 
submicroscopic world; this is the ontological foundation on which what is 
often called ‘molecular reality’, particularly molecular structure, can be under-
stood. 
Part C: Molecular structure in the history of chemistry 
C.1  The discovery of molecular structure 
In the seventeenth century Robert Boyle pointed out that, having accepted 
the Democritean hypothesis that matter consists of atoms, it would still be 
convenient to recognize in the world a sort of architectonic principle which 
operated  since  the  beginning  of  the  Universe.10  Since  he  was  referring  to 
chemistry, it is clear that he felt that atoms should be arranged into edifices; 
but it was only two centuries later, after 1858, amidst heated disputes, that 
molecular structure became a central concept of chemistry – when Kekulé 
realized that the properties of hydrocarbons could be explained by assuming 
that their molecules were analogous to chains of carbon atoms.11  
  We are now going to refer to the structure of benzene as a specific refer-
ence case for our further considerations. Since, however, confusion may arise, 
we warn the reader that the term ‘structure’ is never used here in the sym-
bolic  acceptation  known  from  the  the  quantum-chemical  theory  of  reso-
nance; a short pause on the difference will be made below (Sect. D.3). The 
history  of  benzene, extensively treated from a chemist’s point of view by 
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import of that notion. Paoloni divided the elaboration of the structural for-
mula of benzene into three stages: representation of chemical properties only 
(1865-1874);  representation  of  both  chemical  and  spatial  characteristics 
(1874-1913); global representation, with inclusion of X-ray diffraction results 
(1914-1932). 
  What interests us here is that Kekulé’s original intuition was an analogy 
with gnomes having one or four arms each, holding one another by their 
hands.  Later,  the  standard  analogy  became  that  of  tiny  balls  having  four 
hooks  each  for  carbon,  one  hook  each  for  hydrogen.  A  molecule  was 
assumed to have a spatial configuration determined by the fact that the atoms 
formed bonds, i.e. links similar to the sticks or springs which might hold to-
gether the hooked balls just mentioned. Of course, certain features of the 
structure of the macroscopic would not be transferable to the molecular plane 
of  reality,  nor  could  certain  features  of  its  submicroscopic  counterpart 
(especially those connected with reactivity) be placed in correspondence with 
features of the macroscopic model; but that was part of the game. 
  In  1866  Kekulé  considered  for  benzene  two  possible  alternatives,  pre-
sented as follows:12a 
1. The six carbon atoms are connected to one another in a completely sym-
metric manner […]. The six hydrogen atoms […] occupy completely equiva-
lent  position  in  the  molecule.  One  could  therefore  represent  benzene  by  a 
hexagon whose vertices carry hydrogen atoms. By successive substitution of 
the H atoms by bromine atoms the following isomeric derivatives are possible: 
  monobromo-benzene  1 isomer  
  dibromo-benzene    3 isomers ab, ac, ad  
  tribromo-benzene    3 isomers abc, abd, ace  
  […] 
2. The six hydrogen atoms of benzene form three atomic groups, each consti-
tuted by two carbon atoms held together by two valences each. The group 
appears  in  itself  like  a  triangle.  […]  The  six  hydrogen  atoms  are  therefore 
alternatively  nonequivalent,  and  benzene  could  be represented as a triangle. 
[…] Substitution with bromine atoms would then yield the following isomers: 
  monobromo-benzene  2 isomers: a,b  
  dibromo-benzene    4 isomers ab, ac, bd, ad 
The story of the structure of benzene continued, a variety of proposals were 
made, but in 1872 Kekulé concluded as follows: 
It must be accepted that the atoms of a polyatomic molecule are situated in 
space so as to satisfy as well as possible the attraction forces. [After discussing 
and proposing a variety of atomic configurations,] I have been led, by consid-
erations of a chemical nature, back to my original idea […] 
which was, as is well known, the hexagonal form of benzene with equivalent 
C-C bonds. 92  Giuseppe Del Re 
  The above quotations present the essential steps in the establishment of 
the existence of a specific molecular structure and hence of molecular struc-
ture in general: 
1.  the molecular hypothesis; 
2.  the analogy with a macroscopic model (stick-and-ball model) where 
valencies are saturated as if they were flanged pipes screwed to one an-
other along the same straight line; 
3.  the assumption that substitution takes place by cleavage of a terminal 
bond; 
4.  the proof, by chemical separation of different isomeric substances, that 
correct predictions for the number of isomers are obtained by: 
(a)  choosing macroscopic models with appropriate structures for the 
molecules under consideration, 
(b)  assuming that they are in a one-to-one correspondence with some 
otherwise unknown aspect of those molecules; 
5.  the generalization of point 4, after a careful critical analysis, leading to 
the principle that all atom groups behaving as single particles in the gas 
phase or in a solvent (molecules) have a specific, permanent structure; 
6.  the demonstration that the type of crystals formed by a substance is in 
correspondence with the supposed structure of its molecules. 
Point 4 contains the essential ontological point to be considered here. Let us 
pause on it. 
Reality of molecular structure 
It  has  been  admitted  since  the  dawn  of  philosophy that, even if what we 
know of a thing is at least part of what the thing really is, our knowledge of it 
involves  a  representation  made  by  our  mind.13  Even  now that science and 
technology  have taken our knowledge beyond the Ptolemaic limits of the 
DAL (direct-access level) of reality, our representations are still those of ob-
jects in the DA space, and, as mentioned at the end of Sect. B.3, analogies 
play a fundamental role. When it comes to certain problems, particularly the 
nature of electrons, it may be necessary to resort to double analogies involv-
ing models which would not be compatible at the DA level – particles and 
waves. Even those partial models are anyway ‘analogical’ representations of 
reality  in  the  world  of  molecules.  That  sort  of  reality  which  can  only  be 
grasped by the establishment of a correspondence with some characteristic 
pattern  of  passive  and  active  properties  of  entities  of  the  DA  level  –  a 
‘principle’, as the Ancients would have said. (Note that we have not referred 
here to ‘experimental results’, as is customary, because we wish to emphasize 
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ers, but applies to the response of a quantum system to any perturbation, 
even in the absence of knowing minds.) 
  As it seems, therefore, within the frame of realism one should accept this 
conclusion: what we call the ‘structure’ of a molecule is a principle (an SC 
entity) inherent to molecular reality, and hence real. 
  It  can  be  known  by  analogy  through  the  mediation  of  a  macroscopic 
model, to which the notion of structure properly applies, certain features not 
present in the model being added by an operation of logic and imagination.14 
The geometrical face of molecular structure  
This face is at first sight distinct from the chemical one, an impression that 
has been somehow perpetuated by classical textbooks, despite the unavoid-
able  acceptance  of  geometrical  aspects  when  considering  such  topics  as 
Bayer’s strain theory, or the mechanism of alkene hydrogenation. Actually, as 
appears from Kekulé’s quotations above, this face was included in the very 
idea of structure since its first appearance; the view that there were bonds and 
the  bonds  were  like  joining  sticks  with  a precise orientation in space was 
there even before 1874, when J. H. van’t Hoff and A. J. Le Bel made the spa-
tial configuration of molecules a direct subject for reflection. Since then, it 
was found that not only was the topology described by a written formula or 
the corresponding graph a representation of reality rather than a mere think-
ing aid, but it was not even sufficient in the latter capacity. As mentioned 
above, a merely topological definition of molecular structure related to the 
notion that structural formulas are just graphs is often adopted, but then the 
term ‘structure’ is given a restricted meaning which, as far as our experience 
goes, is not current among chemists engaged in molecular design and syn-
thetic  work:  suffice  it  to  think  of  the  use  of  the  word  ‘structure’  in  the 
chemistry of proteins. 
  One might insist that actually all we have is a macroscopic model, the 
stick-and-ball or the spring-and-ball model, but then one should answer with 
scientific rigor and experimental evidence this question: why do all experi-
ments give results in agreement with the claim that molecules have a structure 
corresponding to that model, in the analogical sense discussed above? 94  Giuseppe Del Re 
Part D: Quantum mechanics, observability, and 
chemical formulas 
D.1  Molecular structure and quantum mechanics 
As mentioned, the founding fathers of quantum mechanics had realized that 
molecular structure corresponds to a rigid (or quasi-rigid) nuclear framework 
(called Kerngerüst in the German literature), and should be considered a fact 
in the two senses already discussed: 
·  topological,  i.e. as a set of privileged rigid (or quasi-rigid) connections 
between particular atoms (bonds), forming one or more continuous paths 
from any given atoms to any other atom; 
·  geometrical, in the sense that only rotations about pairs of atoms con-
nected by one and not more than one bond are allowed. 
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the  existence  of  a  quasi-rigid  nuclear 
framework was the fact on which the approximate schemes for the applica-
tion of quantum mechanics to molecular problems were developed.15 How-
ever, the factual nature of the nuclear geometrical configuration had already 
attracted the attention of the physicists, for it was considered necessary to 
prove that the newborn quantum mechanics was not in conflict with it. This 
was done by Born and Oppenheimer, as already recalled.16 They applied a per-
turbational procedure going back to astronomy and already used by Born and 
Heisenberg in 1924 in the frame of the Bohr-Sommerfeld semi-classical quan-
tum mechanics17 to justify an experimental fact: the grouping of molecular 
spectroscopic terms, which clearly corresponded to the separation of nuclear 
and electronic motions presupposed by molecular structure in Kekulé’s and 
van’t Hoff’s sense. With the application to the new quantum mechanics, they 
actually answered a fundamental question: “If particles are not completely 
localizable  (quantum-mechanical  particle-wave  dualism),  how  can  quantum 
mechanics  respect  the  chemists’  discovery  that  molecules  have  a structure 
corresponding  to  fixed  relative  nuclear  positions,  and,  consequently,  a 
shape?” Their study essentially consisted in a theorem and a corollary: 
Theorem: in the frame of quantum mechanics the nuclei of a molecule can 
be treated as classical particles practically at rest as far as electronic 
motions are concerned; 
Corollary: quantum mechanics is not in conflict with the chemists’ model 
of a molecule as a rigid framework of nuclei held together by shared 
electrons. 
In order to prove their theorem, Born and Oppenheimer (abbr. B-O) showed 
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lent force fields; the displacements of the atoms from their equilibrium posi-
tions  are  very  small  with  respect  to  the bond distances. For example, the 
vibration amplitudes of the carbon nuclei of benzene are at most 0.1 Å at 
room temperature.18 
  The B-O theorem, however, left the possibility open of special quantum 
effects  (now  called  ‘vibronic coupling’), particularly in the case of excited 
states;  therefore,  it  has  become  customary  to  speak  of  the  ‘Born-Oppen-
heimer (B-O) approximation’ when a quantum mechanical study of a mole-
cule is carried out under the assumption that its nuclei are fixed point-like 
sources of an electrostatic field. As a matter of fact, molecular states and their 
evolution are well described under the B-O approximation, except at inter-
sections of potential-energy hypersurfaces corresponding to different elec-
tronic states. At a crossing, the nuclei are ‘seen’ by the electrons as fixed field 
sources; but no genuine molecule with the configuration or configurations at 
which  the  intersection  occurs  exists  as  such  (cf.  Sect.  D.5),  and  vibronic 
coupling only concerns transitions between two structures. 
  Despite these considerations, the issue of molecular shape and structure in 
connection with quantum mechanics, raised in 1978 by a perplexing paper 
entitled ‘Must molecules have a shape?’19 in 1978, is worth further reflection. 
D.2  Existence and observability 
So far, we have shown that the question of the existence of molecular struc-
ture is distinct from that of the atoms which make up the molecule, for the 
chemical and physical properties of the latter depend not only on the nature 
of the atoms, but on the way in which the atoms are connected. Therefore, 
one should either speak directly of ‘properties of molecular structure’ or – 
using  a  circumlocution  more  palatable  to  the  modern  mind  –  speak  of 
‘structure dependent properties of a molecule’. 
  This  amounts  anyway  to  admitting  that  molecular  structure  is  an  SC 
entity having an existence of its own. But what is ‘existence’ in this case? To 
put it more precisely, on what grounds do we say that the structure of a 
molecule exists? The strong realism axiom, stated in section A.1, requires that 
our perceptions tell us something about what a thing is, at least in principle 
and after a severe critical analysis. This requirement is what the physicists, led 
by Einstein and Bohr, have emphasized all along the great advances of physics 
which took place between 1899 and 1937: what we can accept as real must be 
observable. 
  There is much to say about what ‘observability’ means; here we need only 
emphasize again that scientific observation is often indirect, for it is currently 
assumed  that  an  observation  has  been  made  if  there  is  a  unique  chain  of 
arguments  leading  from  the  actually  observed  phenomenon  (say,  the  dis-
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In the case of molecular structure this condition is satisfied by a large number 
and  variety  of  observations,  which  essentially  reduce  to statements of the 
type: “if the molecule of the substance J under study contains a bond con-
necting atoms X and Y, which in turn are connected to the other atoms by 
certain bonds, then a certain laboratory procedure will yield a substance K; 
otherwise  there  will  be  no  reaction  or  another  substance  will  result.”  Of 
course, failure to obtain an expected substance may be just due to experimen-
tal difficulties; but the number and variety of successful tests of this kind, 
plus  the  application  of  similar  lines  of  reasoning  to  physical  properties 
(rotation  of  the  polarization  plane  of  light  waves,  molecular  refraction, 
dielectric constants, X-ray diffraction, etc.) give that overwhelming evidence 
as was already available when quantum mechanics appeared. 
  To sum up our conclusion, unless the very notion of molecule in the sense 
of  Dalton  and  Avogadro  is  rejected,  molecular  structure  and  the  rules  of 
directed valency are facts of nature, belonging to the complexity level where 
the ‘elementary objects’ (building blocks, cf. Sect. B.2) are the atoms of the 
periodic table. 
D.3  Observability and time 
We have mentioned in Sect. D.1 doubts about molecular shape – which, if 
valid, imply that molecular structure is at best of a topological nature. Those 
doubts are shown to be in general unjustified by the B-O theorem recalled in 
Sect. D.1, but, as mentioned, they raise an interesting issue in connection 
with the time evolution of molecular states. 
  We  shall  now  briefly  discuss  that  issue,  with  reference  to  molecular 
ground states.20 
  In  principle,  the  different  isomers  obtained  from  a  given  collection  of 
atoms – an indeterminate system S – are just forms of S corresponding to 
sets of states very weakly coupled to all other states. They give rise to distinct 
substances because, at least at temperatures not much higher than ordinary 
ones, they persist for a significant time, often for longer than a human life-
time.21 Because of this, S in a state belonging to one of those sets is con-
sidered as a separate system – a molecule M unless, of course, its states are 
products of the states of individual atoms or groups of atoms. 
  That this is legitimate is clear from the consideration that, strictly speak-
ing, the only isolated system in the Universe is the Universe itself, and a 
change in a single object is a change of state of the whole Universe. This 
holds even for the change in position of a hydrogen atom traveling alone in 
the background radiation field; but, because the parameters other than the 
velocity  vector  of  that  hydrogen  atom  remain  constant,  the  latter  can  be 
treated as if it were alone.22 But a philosophical difficulty arises. When we say 
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for them to go into states of S not belonging to c c c c may be considered as the set 
of all the states of a molecule M, i.e. a particular system resulting from S by 
imposing to it a particular structure, is that enough for the claim that those 
states belong to a system existing on its own right? The answer is positive, 
that is to say, M exists. In fact, the existence of M is implicit in the existence 
(observability) of its states c c c c in virtue of the following general axioms: 
·  reality exists and can be known; 
·  observation  (direct  or  indirect)  of  the  states  of  a  system  provides 
knowledge of its existence, and of its ‘what-is-it’, i.e. of what charac-
terizes  it  with  respect  to  other  systems  as  perceived  by  the  human 
mind; 
·  observed  properties  are  characteristic  of  the  given  system  in  inter-
actions with other systems, even in the absence of a human observer – 
e.g. the wave-particle dualism applies to a collision between a photon 
and an electron even in the absence of an observation. 
The set  c c c c is the ‘what-is-it’ of M, and M differs from other molecules or 
clusters that may be formed with the same atoms. If M is normally in the 
ground state and the other states can easily decay into it, then the nuclear 
configuration in the ground state determines M with respect to S, and the 
determining principle is the SC entity called ‘structure’. 
  The possible objection that external perturbations (interaction with a pho-
ton,  collision  with  another  particle)  can  make  M  change  into  an  isomeric 
molecule, or dissociate into one or more parts; that, indeed, such a change 
might take place spontaneously, can be met by a question: is my dog Argos 
not a being in all respects, only because it is bound to change one day into a 
carcass, as a result of external agents or age? More explicitly: for the entity M, 
resulting from the ‘information’ of S through a structure, to exist and persist 
as such it is not necessary that it should have an infinite lifetime.23 
  A serious problem arises, on the other hand, when the minimum lifetime 
of a structure is considered. The indeterminate system S might give rise to 
clusters having an extremely small or even a zero lifetime, corresponding to 
temporary aggregates of, say, two distinct molecules formed with its atoms, 
as in a transition state. Even granting that such a state exists as a determina-
tion of S, meaning that its existence is a necessary condition for certain ob-
served events, one cannot say that it is a molecule, for it does not last long 
enough to be observable as such. Strictly speaking, a chemist would accept a 
determination of S as a molecule only if the corresponding pure substance 
could be prepared and isolated. A current softening of this condition consists 
in accepting that a molecule exists if the corresponding substance can be de-
tected as such at least by fast analytical techniques in solution or in the gas 
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  This criterion implies that the lifetime of the individual molecules must be 
longer by a few orders of magnitude than the mean collision time (a couple of 
picoseconds, 10-12 s, for ammonia in the vacuum at room temperature). This 
means that the states c c c c(M) of a molecule M are quasi stationary states which 
will not go into states of S corresponding to other structures faster that a few 
picoseconds.24 
  This remark provides a clear-cut answer also to the question of molecular 
shape recalled in Sect. D.1. Although that is seldom the case, it might happen 
that two equivalent (or even isomeric) structures A and B of S have ground 
states separated by a rather low energy barrier, so that the sets of states c c c c(A) 
and  c c c c(B)  of  S  are  actually  coupled  to  a  significant degree and A changes 
periodically into B. Is it right to say that c c c c(A) and c c c c(B) correspond to two 
distinct structures? 
  The doubt thus raised becomes more puzzling when it is considered that 
quantum mechanically this situation may be represented as one where there 
are stationary states in Bohr’s sense (i.e. states extremely weakly coupled in 
the absence of external perturbations) which are linear combinations of states 
corresponding to both structures. One might be tempted to claim that in 
such cases quantum mechanics is not compatible with the geometrical face of 
molecular structure. There is a flaw in the line of reasoning leading to this 
conclusion which can be illustrated on the case of the ammonia molecule.25 
  Classically,  the  ammonia  molecule  NH3  is  endowed  with  an  inversion 
vibration,  i.e.  oscillation  between  two pyramidal configurations having the 
nitrogen  atom  on  either  side  of  the  basis,  formed  by  the  three  hydrogen 
atoms. Quantum-mechanically, this means that the quantum states of am-
monia come in pairs of weakly coupled degenerate components |Nup> and 
|Ndown>. After they have been prepared e.g. by making NH3 molecules pass 
through  a  strongly  non-homogeneous  electric  field,  there  is  a  periodically 
changing  probability  that  a  successive  observation  will  find  in  a  state 
|Ndown>  a  molecule  originally  in  |Nup>,  and  conversely.  The  period  is 
precisely  the  classical  inversion  period  (0.035  ps).  Now,  according  to  the 
preceding remark, Bohr’s quasi-stationary states can be built by combining 
|Nup> and |Ndown> with equal weights. This transforms each degenerate 
pair into a doublet of closely lying states corresponding to a planar symmetry. 
Ergo, one might say, the ammonia molecule, which the chemists expect to be 
pyramidal, is actually planar; the only way out from this aporia is to admit 
that it has no shape. Here is the answer. As shown by Feynman, even a slight 
perturbation would make either of the stationary states collapse into either 
|Nup> or |Ndown> which correspond to pyramidal shapes associated with 
angular  momentum  quantization;  quantum  mechanics  says  that  no  inter-
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interacts with any other particle, the ammonia molecule always behaves as a 
pyramidal structure; the planar stationary states are useful mathematical inter-
mediates, and could be attributed a physical meaning only when time periods 
far  longer  than  the  inversion  period  are  considered, as when a microwave 
photon is emitted or absorbed.26 Note that the potential energy profile for 
ammonia inversion is a double well, with energy minima corresponding to the 
two pyramidal configurations. 
  The case of the Kekulé ‘structures’ of benzene introduced in the chemical 
resonance theory should be mentioned, because confusion may arise from the 
fact that there the term ‘structure’ stands for ‘bond arrangement’, the nuclear 
frame  being  ignored.  As  such,  those  structures  correspond  to  degenerate 
electronic states associated to the same nuclear configuration. In that sense 
they are crude approximations of structures predicted by the chemical theory 
of molecular structure, which should have alternating short and long bonds. 
If thus redefined, they show the real nature of the major contribution of 
quantum mechanics to the theory of chemistry: the two degenerate struc-
tures, at variance with the case of ammonia, do not correspond to energy 
minima, and it is their 50–50 linear combination which does so; consequently, 
out of the 217 isomers mentioned above, at least the two corresponding to a 
distorted hexagon alternating (long) single and (short) double bonds are only 
realized as extremes of a vibration; therefore, in accordance with the above 
analysis,  they  cannot  be  treated  as  representations  of  a  genuine  molecule. 
Even a perturbation would not normally stabilize them – at variance with the 
case of ammonia –, because the energy required is large. 
  In sum, doubts about the existence of molecular structure and molecular 
shape (except as regards resonance of electronic structures) seem to be due to 
a misunderstanding: it is not the mathematics of quantum mechanics that 
determines what exists and what does not exist in the world of FC and SC R2 
entities, but their experimental observability. This point, as it seems, should 
be taken as a starting point for reflections on molecules and their structure, in 
full agreement with Bohr’s Kopenhagener Geist der Quantentheorie. As to its 
implications for the ontology of the world of molecules, the above discussion 
is only a first exploration, which should be followed by quite a subtle and 
intricate technical discussion. 
D.4  Status of molecular structure and bonds 
Apart from our last remark, we have reached a general conclusion which can 
be summarized as follows:  
Molecular  structure  is  a  static  topological  and  geometrical  order  principle 
which belongs to the reality of a molecule, indeed is what distinguishes a par-
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atoms. It is a ‘principle’ in the following sense: it is a unitary SC entity to 
which a variety of observable molecular properties belong; it can only be ob-
served, as any other entity, through properties which depend on it; indeed, the 
latter belong to it, in the sense that, (a), they are inseparable, (b) they vanish as 
soon as the structure disappears, (c), they all change more or less dramatically 
if the structure changes. 
What is the status of molecular structure from the complexity viewpoint? 
This question arises from the analysis of example 4b of Sect. A.2, where we 
have suggested that what makes a whole a whole may range from a set of 
essentially additive properties to something entirely new with respect to the 
parts, having properties of its own (organization). It would seem that it has 
already something in common with organization; to be sure, it is not related 
to actual exchange of information, but it makes a molecule behave as a whole, 
as is shown immediately by the remark that, at variance with a crystal, cleav-
age of a bond yields molecules (radicals or ions, in general) having completely 
different properties. This is the reason why it is a ‘principle’; and the qualifi-
cation ‘static’ used above is a concise way of telling that it does not cor-
respond, as the organization of a cell (example b, Sect. B.2), to an internal 
activity capable of adaptation to a changing environment. 
  This consideration completes as it were the evidence in favor of the claim 
that, far from being a property of symbolic diagrams, molecular structure is a 
real SC entity which cannot be reduced to ‘atoms and quanta’. There remain, 
of course, many subordinate questions, the most important one being the 
existence of the chemical bond. To answer this question in detail it would be 
necessary to retread the path followed for structure; we only recall here that, 
as the analogy by which structure becomes intelligible to us is that with the 
stick-and-ball, or, better, spring-and-ball model of a molecule, so also a bond 
as an SC entity must be defined by means of an analogy (a privileged connec-
tion  analogous  to  a  quasi-rigid  spring  but,  for  one  thing,  not  isolable)  to 
which corrections and reservations are added. 
D.5  Structures and formulas 
In the work already cited, Schummer pointed out that structural formulas 
may be looked at as analogical representations (which stand for molecules in 
virtue of an analogy) helping chemists to keep track of the static and dynamic 
properties of molecules.27 This view has its merits, for it emphasizes that the 
chemists do not work with mathematical symbols, as the physicists do, but 
with schematic topological and geometrical representations of molecules. It 
might be misleading, however, to think that structural formulas are only a 
reminder of molecular properties. Indeed, since the beginning there was great 
emphasis on their faithfulness to the spatial arrangement of atoms and bonds. 
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of  a  molecule  in  space  is  the  tool  for  designing  new,  strange  molecules 
(‘supermolecules’)28 and for understanding the role of configurations in bio-
chemical processes. 
  Apart  from  the  great  historical  events  (such  as  the  discovery  of  the 
biochemical significance of protein and DNA conformations), suffice it to 
mention that in a single issue of Nature, chosen at random from a bookshelf, 
we found formulas used both to represent schematically the conformations 
of immunoglobulin29 and to show how certain supermolecules could be ob-
tained by inserting two independent cyclic molecules one into the other (as 
chain  rings,  ‘catenanes’).30  We  add  that  geometry-dependent  features  like 
Bayer strains characterize molecules which are comparatively unstable and/or 
highly reactive: e.g. (in today’s formulas) a hydrocarbon molecule represented 
by a triangle on paper is more ‘strained’ than one represented by a pentagon, 
because the angles are 60° instead of 108°. 
  Thus,  a  structural  formula  can  be  interpreted  as  a  representation  of  a 
molecule with its structure in the same way as a drawing of a person can be 
used to discuss the difference in profile between that person and another. As 
said, this consideration is not in contrast with the use of chemical formulas as 
‘thinking aids’, but it should be kept in mind in order not to fall into traps 
like misunderstanding the meaning and epistemological status of the Born-
Oppenheimer approximation (Sect. D.1). 
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